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1. Chapter One Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Aqaba is a city located in the southern part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 
which is about 330 kilometers from the capital Amman to the south. In 2001, it was 
transformed into the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) becoming central access, 
with three continents Africa, the Middle East and West Asia intersecting and 
establishing a global axis for investors and tourists alike (ASEZA, 2017). The region 
extends to the borders of Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt's territorial waters and lies on 
the Gulf of Aqaba, which flows into the Red Sea (Gladstone, Facey, & Hariri, 2006). It 
forms a strategic entrance for regional and international markets. The age of the port of 
Aqaba is linked to the age of the city itself, which dates back to the thirteenth century 
BC (ASEZA, 2017). 
 
The Gulf of Aqaba is the link between the Far East, India and the Middle East 
without the need to go through the Suez Canal, which is located on latitude (29.31) north 
and longitude (35.01) east in the Gulf of Aqaba. Moreover, the only port access to 
Jordan has great economic importance due to it’s commercial, industrial and tourist 




The port of Aqaba one of the most important elements in the maritime transport 
activities and a major center for Jordanian maritime trade activity. The port of Aqaba has 
a prominent role in the development of the Jordanian economy and to the transiting 
cargo of neighboring countries and this is evident through the active trade movement 
carried out in the port system (Ministry of Transport, 2017)  
 
The Gulf of Aqaba is a commercially active area, including the transport of 
passengers and goods by sea. Thus, it is vulnerable to maritime casualties, which could 
threaten the safety of life and the marine environment. Therefore, it is necessary for 
experts to conduct a marine casualty investigation and identify the causes and factors of 
the casualty through investigating the technical, legal, and administrative aspects in the 
ship (JMC, 2019). 
 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) was formally established in 1948, 
through an international conference in Geneva under the name Inter-Governmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) to deal with shipping matters (IMO, 2019). 
IMO as an international organization has developed many international instruments such 
as conventions, protocols as international legislative provisions and international 
controls, and resolutions as a non-binding way to help the member States to achieve the 
requirements of saving lives, and protecting the marine environment (IMO, 2019). 
 
IMO is a regulatory body for one hundred and seventy-four member States that 
have their sovereignty and have ratified the international instruments with common high 
standards for all these member States (Amin, McDevitt, & Gibbs, 2018).  The rapid 
increase in the volume of maritime trade in Jordan is putting an enormous obligations on 
Jordan to ensure safety in the Jordanian territorial waters and ships that fly the Jordanian 




1.2 Research Questions  
This study will highlight marine casualty investigation in Jordan, including the 
current implementation of IMO standards. Moreover, it will try to find opportunities for 
improvement and development by going through national legislation. In addition, it will 
define the gap between the implementation and the best practice to fulfil the maritime 
administration’s obligations in Jordan with respect to the Casualty Investigation Code.  
By focusing on the objectives, the key research questions are: 
 What is the state of the art in Jordan as regards the IMO Casualty Investigation 
Code’s implementation and application? 
 What are the practical challenges before and after the IMO Member State Audit 
Scheme (IMSAS) audit to identify the key areas for improvement?  
 What are the pathways to fix the current status of such regulations in Jordan 
and meet the obligations of the Casualty Investigation Code? 
 
1.3 Objectives and Aims 
The essential goal of this research is to provide a wider perspective of the 
deficiencies faced in the current implementation of IMO legislation on casualty 
investigation and then identify the potential for development in Jordan.  
The objectives of the study are as follow: 
 To analyze and evaluate the current practice of the Casualty Investigation Code 
and the national policy in Jordan; 
 To identify the practical challenges before and after IMSAS audit to identify 
the key areas for improvement;  
 To highlight the gap through an analysis of the current status in Jordan and 






This study utilizes the legal-normative approach while going through the primary 
resources of all relevant legal instruments. Such as conventions, codes, resolutions and 
publications of IMO in respect to marine casualty investigation. In addition, the national 
law, regulations that imposed to implement the marine casualty investigation in Jordan. 
Moreover, the study refers to secondary resources of data analysis. A large volume of 
sources of available data from public documents and official records, annual reports 
from JMC and all their maritime stakeholders. Primary and secondary sources of data 
from pertinent reports, articles, official websites, and books were utilized to highlight the 
challenges that faced by Jordan and other factors that influenced the current 
implementation of IMO legislation in Jordan’s maritime administration in casualty 
investigation.  
 
Hence, the critical analysis and the results will be used to find the gaps, link the 
regulations in Jordan to the corresponding IMO legislations. The SWOT analysis tool 
and descriptive analysis are applied to look at different factors. In addition, interviews 
are the guiding methods used in this study.  
 
Overall, any research involves ethical issues, and this research studies confidential 
reports and documents. Therefore, the ethical issues will be dealt with as per the 
regulations of World Maritime University (WMU) and the concerned authorities. 
 
1.5 Dissertation Structure  
In order to achieve the main aim of this dissertation, the research consists of the 
following six chapters (see Figure 1): 
Chapter one will cover the comprehensive background of the research and 
present the problems related to the chosen topic. These research questions seek to 
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identify the gaps between the current status of casualty investigation in Jordan and 
optimal implementation of the international instruments dealing with the topic.  
 
Chapter two will highlight the interaction between the international instruments 
that contain the legal framework for maritime casualty investigations, and the legal and 
institutional framework of Jordan as a sovereign country.  
 
Chapter three employs different sources for different States in terms of how 
they set out the marine casualty investigation concepts, process and models into their 
national legislations. This will help to know if Jordan legislation reflects a better 
understanding of the marine casualty investigation concept.   
 
Chapter four presents the factors that contribute to accomplishing a marine 
casualty investigation in a successful way. This chapter will address whether these 
factors are present in Jordan´s legislation and enforcement machinery in a manner 
capable of fulfilling international obligations.    
 
Chapter five will provide the findings of the SWOT analytical tool applied to 
the current situation of the casualty investigation implementation in Jordan in order to 
learn about the potential for future development in Jordan.  
 
Chapter six will present the conclusion and recommendations based on the 
findings presented in Chapter five in order to improve the current performance in Jordan 







The next Chapter discusses the international and institutional legal framework 
that regulates marine casualty investigation in Jordan. In addition, the interaction 
between the international instruments and the institutional framework will be 
highlighted clearly to show how the regulatory framework appears with respect to its 










2. Chapter 2 International and Institutional Legal Framework 
The interaction at the national level among the constitutional requirements of the 
State and international conventions and treaties has enormous implications for the 
maritime governance of all States (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013). The implication 
such as ratifying the IMOs’ conventions and treaties requires the State to  enact the 
legislations that are harmonious with their national needs and in the same time to meets 
their international obligation (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013). Therefore, to measure the 
effectiveness of the performance of States in meeting their international obligations. 
IMO has adopted a mechanism to evaluate the performance periodically concerning its 
obligations as a maritime administration, the extent of implementation and enforcement 
of the IMO instruments (IMO, 2013). 
 
 Consequently, this Chapter will address the international instruments imposed 
by IMO and other international organizations that regulate marine casualties. On the 
other hand, how Jordan respond to these international instruments by forming the legal 
and institutional framework to ensure maritime safety and avoid recurrence of accidents 
in the future, which will be discussed as well. Moreover, will be highlighted how Jordan 
respond to IMO mechanism to measure the maritime administration performance with 




2.1 International Instruments 
A series of maritime accidents have occurred over the past 100 years and have 
forced the international maritime community to adopt international conventions on 
safety responsibility and environmental protection (Ibn Awal & Hasegawa, 2017). Over 
decades, IMO has made significant efforts to improve and ensure a high and effective 
standard in regard to safety, considering marine accidents and their prevention a main 
driver of the many instruments issued and activities undertaken by IMO (IMO, 2019). A 
remarkable series of conventions and other essential instruments, protocols, 
amendments, recommendations, codes, guidelines and resolutions that are making 
shipping safer, simpler and more standardized (IMO, 2019). 
 
The act of ratification is binding, and obligates member States to implement the 
instruments. In terms of casualty investigation, each member State is obligated to take 
the necessary measures, in respect of its legislative environment, to undertake 
investigations into marine accidents. This is an obligation according to the article 94 of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982 (UN, 1982). 
 
IMO has focused its concern on maritime safety investigations and their results 
through a remarkable series of conventions (Figure 2) such as; the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, as amended (SOLAS). The International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 (MARPOL), as modified by 
the Protocol of 1978 relating there to, and by the Protocol of 1997. The International 
Convention on Load Lines 1966 (LL). Other essential instruments, such as protocols, 
codes, guidelines and resolutions make shipping safer, simpler and more standardized, 








After sinking of Titanic accident in 1912, SOLAS Convention was adopted by 
international cooperation after two years in 1914 as the first initiative on safety 
regulations. SOLAS was replaced with many updated versions up to the last one SOLAS 
Convention 1974 (Ibn Awal & Hasegawa, 2017). IMO has set requirements for the 
investigation in Regulation 21 - Causalities of the SOLAS Convention 1974, says:  
“(a) Each Administration undertakes to conduct an investigation of any casualty 
occurring to any of its ships subject to the provisions of the present Convention 
when it judges that such an investigation may assist in determining what changes 
in the present regulations might be desirable.  
(b) Each Contracting Government undertakes to supply the Organization with 
pertinent information concerning the findings of such investigations. No reports 
or recommendations of the Organization based upon such information shall 
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disclose the identity or nationality of the ships concerned or in any manner fix or 
imply responsibility upon any ship or person” (IMO, 1974).  
 
The accident of oil spill off from The Torrey Canyon on French and Cornish 
coasts in 1967,  call the international maritime community to MARPOL Convention and 
was adopted in 1973 (Ibn Awal & Hasegawa, 2017). MARPOL Convention is defined 
the marine accident from the environment perspective, Article 2 – Definition of The 
MARPOL Convention 1973, says:    
“(6). "Incident" means an event involving the actual or probable discharge into 
the sea of a harmful substance, or effluents containing such a substance” (IMO, 
2006). 
In addition, the MARPOL Convention specified the States obligations to 
investigate any casualty may harme the marine environment. Article 12 - Casualties to 
ships, says: 
“(1). Each Administration undertakes to conduct an investigation of any casualty 
occurring to any of its ships subject to the provisions of the regulations if such 
casualty has produced a major deleterious effect upon the marine environment. 
(2). Each Party to the Convention undertakes to supply the Organization with 
information concerning the findings of such investigation, when it judges that 
such information may assist in determining what changes in the present 
Convention might be desirable” (IMO, 2006). 
 
Similarly, IMO addresses marine accident investigation in the LL Convention 
1966. Article 23 – Casualties of LL Convention 1966, say:  
“(1) Each Administration undertakes to conduct an investigation of any casualty 
occurring to ships for which it is responsible and which are subject to the 
provisions of the present 13 Convention when it judges that such an investigation 
may assist in determining what changes in the Convention might be desirable.  
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(2) Each Contracting Government undertakes to supply the Organization with 
the pertinent information concerning the findings of such investigations. No 
reports or recommendations of the Organization based upon such information 
shall disclose the identity or nationality of the ships concerned or in any manner 
fix or imply responsibility upon any ship or person”. (IMO, 2005) 
 
In addition, IMO adopted a resolution on 25 November 1999, and it is an 
amendment of the Code for the investigation of marine casualties and incidents 
(Resolution A.849 (20)) (IMO, 2000). The role that this resolution plays is to enhance 
preventative measures by offering practical advice for the investigation of human factors 
in marine casualties (IMO, 2000). Moreover, it calls all the States to improve the quality 
of marine investigation reports and complete the reports as soon as practicable (IMO, 
2000).  
 
IMO realized the need to adopt a common approach in conducting maritime 
safety casualty investigations to prevent casualties in the future. Therefore, IMO adopted 
resolution MSC.255 (84) on 16 May 2008, the international standards and recommended 
practices for a safety investigation into a marine casualty or marine incident (Casualty 
Investigation Code) (IMO, 2008). IMO has designed this instrument as a guide to 
conducting marine casualty investigations and to regulating and standardizing the 
investigation mechanism for flag States and coastal States to follow (IMO, 2008).  
 
IMO adopted, on 4 December 2013, Resolution A.1075 (28) and its guidelines to 
assist investigators in the implementation of the casualty investigation code (Resolution 
MSC.255 (84)) (IMO, 2014). Despite the best of IMO's endeavors for the purpose of 
enhancing the safety of life at sea and protecting the marine environment, accidents 
resulting in loss of life and ships and pollution of the marine environment, continue to 
occur (IMO, 2014). Therefore, recognizing that remedial measures to reduce maritime 
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accidents are the best solution, IMO emphasizes the training of investigators and 
analysis of the sequence of events to identify casualty occurrence. Moreover, IMO 
stresses the need for cooperation among States to investigate maritime accidents in order 
to determine their circumstances and causes (IMO, 2014) this resolution revokes both 
resolutions A.849 (20) and A.884 (21) (IMO, 2014). 
 
It is worth pointing out that the abovementioned instruments are not the only 
ones being adopted by IMO. IMO has also worked hard to adopt other applicable 
instruments, for example, the IMO circulation (MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.3) was issued on 18 
December 2008. In this instrument, which requires the States to report the casualty 
investigations to IMO. In addition, IMO has adopted other instruments to conduct audits 
of the maritime administrations to verify their compliance with the requirements of the 
international conventions (IMO, 2013). 
 
The States may obtain some benefits by implementing IMO instruments, in 
particular the enhancing of maritime safety and security and the prevention of pollution 
from ships. However, these benefits can only be fully obtained when the member States 
implement the obligations as required under the related instruments (IMO, 2013).  
 
Therefore, IMO has designed key performance indicators (KPI's) to assist the 
member States in adopting and implementing the conventions to improve maritime 
safety and environmental protection. Thus, IMO completed the legal framework of the 
mandatory IMSAS in May 2014 (IMO, 2019). Moreover, IMO adopted the IMO 
Instruments Implementation Code (III Code) through a resolution A.1070 (28) which 
came into force on 1 January 2016. This code is focused on the three key aspects for a 
maritime organization (IMO, 2013). These key aspects are implementation, enforcement 
and review. Each member State needs to evaluate its performance periodically 
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concerning its obligations as a flag State, port State and coastal State and the extent of 
implementation and enforcement of the IMO instruments (IMO, 2013).  
 
Overlooking the main role of the other international organizations to ensure 
maritime safety and security is difficult. Therefore, a significant venture was made by 
the International Labor Organization (ILO), to ensure seafarers rights and to achieve 
decent working conditions on board ship. Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) was 
adopted in 2006 and entered into force in 2013, as legal instruments in the international 
maritime regime (Adăscăliţeia, 2014).  Regulation 5.1.6 on Marine Causalities of MLC 
Convention 2006, says:  
“1. Each Member shall hold an official inquiry into any serious marine casualty, 
leading to injury or loss of life, that involves a ship that flies its flag. The final 
report of an inquiry shall normally be made public. 
2. Members shall cooperate with each other to facilitate the investigation of 
serious marine casualties referred to in paragraph 1 of this Regulation” (ILO, 
2006).  
 
As the previous part elaborated the legal instruments in the international scope 
regarding the marine casualty investigation. The next part of this chapter will discuss the 
legal and institutional framework of the maritime administration in Jordan. By focusing 
on the hard dimension which is the legal framework, and the soft dimension which is the 
institutional framework in light of its interaction among the international instruments 
that decreed by the international organizations, and the national needs. 
 
2.2 Legal and Institutional Framework in Jordan 
By Jordan Maritime Commission Law No. 46 for the year 2006. A national 
government entity with legal, financial and administrative authority was established in 
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Jordan, called the Jordan Maritime Commission (JMC), which is linked to the Ministry 
of Transport (MOT).  JMC plays the role of maritime administration in Jordan (JMC, 
2006). 
 
Policy development precedes the issuance of legislation, including regulations 
and instructions (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013). In policy development, the purpose is 
not always to enact legislation to implement a specific policy initiative of the 
government or to promote and protect national preferences. In some cases, member 
States should meet the legal obligation arising out of the international instruments. 
Therefore, the member States seek to transform the international instruments into 
national legislation (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013). 
 
2.2.1 The Legal Framework   
According to Article 4 of JMC Law 46, JMC primarily aims to effectively and 
efficiently regulate, supervise to improve the maritime sector including, all modes of 
transportation, stationary and moving equipment, labor force, and associated services. 
JMC Law 46 also provides guidance to implement Jordan’s economic and social plans in 
conformity with the provisions of Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority (ASEZA) 
Law. Furthermore, it enhances the private sector's role in contributing to improve and 
develop the maritime sector. Simultaneously, it encourages competition and prevents 
monopoly in the sector. Finally, it provides support for the protection of the marine 
environment by boosting maritime safety standards (JMC, 2006).  
 
In order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives, JMC shall perform several 
functions, including as per paragraph H, in Article 5 of JMC Law 46, which further 
elaborates the investigation of maritime accidents and catastrophes within Jordanian 




JMC has worked hard to establish a legal framework to realize the 
abovementioned objectives. To this end, technical instructions are issued taking into 
account the international law in order to meet international standards. These regulations 
and guidelines at the national level reflect what Jordan has committed to as a member 
State of the United Nations (UN), since 14 December 1955 (UN, 2019). Similarly, 
Jordan is a member State in IMO and a signatory to international maritime conventions, 
since 1973 (IMO, 2019). According to article 9 of the JMC Law 46, the Board of JMC 
shall conduct several functions and terms of reference, including paragraph K in article 
9, JMC Law 46, which authorizes JMC to prepare and enact the instructions for the 
administration’s procedures and operations (JMC, 2006).  
 
In this context, Jordan has a significant interest in adopting all IMO instruments 
related to casualty investigation affairs. The section below will review the JMC 
instructions issued to meet the main vital IMO instruments to elaborate JMC’s legal 
framework in casualty investigation matters. The relevant regulations are taken from 
different conventions.  
 
JMC ratified the SOLAS Convention on 10 October 2006 (JMC, 2019). JMC 
Instructions for Implementing (SOLAS) have been issued by JMC to comply with 
SOLAS Convention, 1974 in marine casualty matters, in which it stated that JMC should 
conduct an investigation into any incident involving any ship belonging to it and subject 
to the provisions of the Convention (JMC, 2006). 
 
JMC has acquired the obligation to implement and fulfil the requirements of the 
Casualty Investigation Code through the signing of the SOLAS Convention. Therefore, 
JMC issued an instruction called “Instructions to Implement the Maritime Accidents and 




In addition, JMC has made an intensive effort to develop measures to improve 
maritime safety and to conduct maritime investigations according to the MARPOL 
Convention. JMC signed the MARPOL convention on 2 September 2006 (JMC, 2019); 
JMC Instructions for Applying the Annexes of MARPOL of 1973 and its Amendments 
have been issued by JMC to comply with MARPOL Convention in marine casualty 
matters (JMC, 2006). 
 
Similarly, JMC ratified the LL Convention on 17 August 2000 (JMC, 2019). 
JMC issued the Instructions for Implementing the International Convention on Load 
Lines of 1966 and it is Protocol of 1988 for the year (2014), to comply with this 
convention. Article 13 from the LL instruction 2014, states that JMC may investigate 
any incident involving ships for which it is responsible and subject to the provisions of 
the LL Convention when it deems that such an investigation may help identify possible 
changes to the convention. Moreover, JMC shall provide the IMO with the relevant 
information concerning the results of such investigations, provided that the reports or 
recommendations to IMO based on such information do not reveal the identity or 
nationality of the ships concerned or assume responsibility in any way for a ship or a 
person or even hint at it  (JMC, 2014). 
 
In addition, JMC has not overlooked its accession to the MLC Convention. 
Therefore, a royal decree was issued to approve the Prime Minister’s decision 6276 
dated on 5 November 2014. This official decision approved Jordan's accession to the 
Convention (JMC, 2014). Moreover, JMC has issued Instructions for the application of 
the MLC in response to the ratification on 16 February 2017, to comply with MLC 2006 




2.2.2 The Institutional Framework  
Usually, the substantive elements of the maritime policy are largely built on 
marine environment, maritime safety and security concerns. Admittedly, the policy 
begins at the top functional levels of management (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013). 
 
The regulatory functions of maritime management personnel are mostly technical 
in nature and include inspections, technical survey and certification under the various 
relevant IMO and ILO conventions (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013). Therefore, the 
human element is indispensable in contributing to the initiation of maritime policy, with 
its technical and managerial experience, capable of planning and formulating rational 
policy for consideration by the Director-General (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013). 
 
In Jordan particular attention will be given to JMC's strategic plan, its mission, 
vision and organizational structure to elaborate on the extent that JMC is the competent 
authority in implementing the Casualty Investigation Code. Moreover, JMC is working 
to meet its international obligations to ensure maritime safety through its organizational 
structure in achieving its vision, mission and objectives that are set out in its laws. 
 
JMC was keen in its vision to establish a maritime sector with a high level of 
safety and quality and to open new opportunities for investments (JMC, 2019). JMC’s 
mission statement is as follows:  
“Achieving the highest International standards for organizing, control and 
developing of the maritime sector in Jordan including legislation, transportation 
modes, services and human recourses taking into account the protection of the 
marine environment and enhancing the maritime safety and security to enhance 





The top management level will formulate policy in this matter as to whether it 
concerns the ratification of an international convention or treaty by the government. For 
this reason, the Maritime Administration has begun to consult with national stakeholders 
in public and private sectors (Mukherjee & Brownrigg, 2013). 
 
On one hand, JMC represents the sovereignty of Jordan in the maritime transport 
sector as it provides a regulatory environment and further monitors, develops and 
maintains the marine environment and raises the level of maritime safety and security in 
the maritime transport sector (JMC, 2017). On the other hand, JMC depends on private 
entities for certain port operations. For instance, Aqaba Development Corporation 
(ADC) is an infrastructure developer, working to create a convenient environment for 
investors. Aqaba Port Marine Services Company (APMS) operates pilotage and towage 
services. Additionally, Aqaba Company for Ports Operation and Management (ACPOM) 
is responsible for establishing, developing, maintaining and operating port activities 
(receiving of ships, handling and storing cargo) to provide customers with a complete 
package of services to facilitate the customers' cargo operations (JMC, 2017). 
 
The strategic relationship between JMC and the private entities in the Jordanian 
maritime transport sector provides clear support for the efforts of the maritime 
administration in several important areas such as maritime safety and security, global 
connectivity, maritime environment protection, preparedness and emergency response, 
and marine services (JMC, 2017). Further, these bodies cooperate to improve the 
maritime transport sector in Jordan and raise the bar up high, with a focus on finding a 
permanent working mechanism and coordinating periodic meetings to facilitate a 
working mechanism between the governments and private agencies involved in 





The organizational structure of JMC was designed by IMOs experts’ 
recommendation when it was established in 2002, reflecting the functions of maritime 
administrations in line with developments in the nature of maritime work and the nature 
of the Commission's work to comply with the requirements of IMO to achieve full 
implementation of the provisions of international conventions (Hubbard & Hoppe, 
2001). The organizational structure of JMC was issued coinciding with the promulgation 
of the Organizational Administrative Regulation of JMC No. (65) 2014, in Issue No. 
(5291) / the Official Gazette dated 16/6/2014, in which the organizational units in the 







As shown in Figure 3, JMC consists of a Board of Directors, Director General, 
and Executive Body. The Board of Directors includes the MOT as Chairman, the 
Director-General of JMC as Vice Chairman, the Commander of the Royal Jordanian 
Navy Force, two representatives of the public sector and two representatives of the 
private sector. 
 
In addition, Figure 3 shows clearly the accident investigation division within the 
Technical and Safety Directorate. Moreover, according to the job description card of this 
division, the main task is supervising and conducting maritime accident investigations 
within the territorial waters and on Jordanian ships, wherever they exist (JMC, 2018). 
 
In the last part of this Chapter will address JMC responded to the IMSAS audit 
as IMO effective measurement tools. In addition, will highlight the findings and 
observation that the audit report mentioned to enhance the Jordan performance regarding 
the Casualty Investigation Code.  
 
2.3 Jordan Legal and Institutional Framework after the Audit  
It is worth mentioning that Jordan’s maritime administration has undergone the 
IMSAS audit. The audit was undertaken from 14 to 23 October 2016. The audit was 
conducted through a series of field visits, interviews, and examination of documented 
records and databases, and objective evidence, to determine the extent to which JMC has 
achieved the objectives (IMO, 2016). The IMO audit report included findings, 
observations and corrective actions to help Jordan improve its performance to meet its 
international responsibilities and obligations.  
 
The IMO audit report stated that JMC has adopted the Casualty Investigation 
Code. However, it was noted that the requirements of this code are not contained in JMC 
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Law 46. JMC Instruction 2007 has adopted Resolution A.849 (20) but had not been 
amended according to Resolution A.1075 (28) which revokes Resolution A.849 (20) 
(IMO, 2016). 
 
In this context, for the purposes of giving full and complete effect to the 
provisions of applicable Casualty Investigation Code, the audit team found that there 
was no objective evidence to prove that Jordan had a comprehensive policy to support, 
implement and enforce the national legislation and regulations (IMO, 2016). See 
Appendix 1 (FD-4).  
 
On this occasion, after reviewing and examining the Jordanian national 
legislation before IMSAS audit. JMC issued on 31 May 2007 instructions called 
“Instructions for Investigation on Maritime Accidents and Incidents, 2007” (JMC, 2007) 
in respect to the Casualty Investigation Code, hereinafter called Instructions 2007. 
(JMC, 2007).  
 
After IMSAS audit JMC responded to the IMO audit report recommendations 
with corrective action and initiated the necessary corrections to improve the discharge of 
its duties. To that end, JMC scrambled to issue new instructions. On 16 February 2017, 
the Instructions 2017 was issued (JMC, 2017). Instructions 2007 was revoked by 
instructions 2017 (JMC, 2017).  
 
By comparison, between Instructions 2007 and Instructions 2017, it has been 
observed that Instruction 2007 stipulated eighteen articles in which Jordan has identified 
several aspects of the Casualty Investigation Code that meet its national needs and fulfil 
its international obligations (JMC, 2007). However, Instructions 2017 just stipulates four 
articles as it is: Article 1 states the title of the Instructions 2017; Article 2 states the 
definition of the Commission as JMC, the Organization as IMO, and the Code as the 
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Casualty Investigation Code. Article 3 states that JMC just shall apply the Casualty 
Investigation Code and its rules, and the objectives of the code are an integral part of 
these Instructions 2017. Article 4 says that Instructions 2017 revokes Instructions 2007 
(JMC, 2017).  
 
According to Abu Zeid (2019)1, it is not necessary, that all provisions of the 
Casualty Investigation Code should be stated on Instructions 2017. JMC is convinced 
that Article 3 of Instructions 2017 is meet the international obligations and IMO 
instruments. Therefore, such as IMSAS audit will not record any findings or 
observations that related to Jordan’s implementation of the international Instruments in 
the future.  
 
2.4 Summary and Conclusions 
Remarkably, Jordan has ratified all the international instruments related to 
marine casualty investigation imposed by IMO and ILO. JMC as a maritime 
administration provides for both international maritime policy formulation and its 
transformation into law, implementation and enforcement. From a practical view, little 
attention is paid to national requirements. In particular, when JMC had overlooked the 
national needs and striving hard to maintain Jordan reputations at the international level 
by issued the Instructions 2017.   
 
The next Chapter will address the current legal and empirical framework in 
Jordan. A depth clarification to casualties’ investigations purposes, marine casualty 
concept and scope. Moreover, it will discuss the investigation process, methodologies, 
and scientific models to help in the investigation. In addition, highlight different States' 
perspective in the implementation of the Casualty Investigation Code. 
                                                      









3. Chapter 3 Current Legal and Empirical Framework in Jordan 
In this chapter will find out how Jordan is implementing the provisions of the 
code through highlight Jordan law, regulations, policies, procedures and compare it with 
different academic resources and the provisions of the Casualty Investigation Code. In 
addition, the authors’ opinions - of the academic resources that used in this study - will 
highlighted different ways and forming policies for different States to implement the 
Casualty Investigation Code. While perusing and learning these different policies and 
national laws in implementing. It should highlight the investigation code to know the 
parts of the Casualty Investigation Code. 
 
3.1 Casualty Investigation Purposes  
IMO through the Casualty Investigation Code, (2008), adopts international 
standards and recommends optimal practices for safety investigation into a maritime 
casualty. The Casualty Investigation Code is divided into three parts: Part I, titled – 
General Provisions, Part II, titled – Mandatory Standards, and Part III, titled – 
Recommended Practices (IMO, 2008).  
 
According to Casualty Investigation Code (2008) - part I, an investigation is 
intended to prevent maritime casualties in the future. The code seeks to achieve this 
objective through the implementation of a uniform and harmonized approach to 
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detecting causal factors that threaten maritime safety. Moreover, the results of reports 
should be publicized to the broadest range (IMO, 2008). 
 
When a serious marine casualty occurs, the Casualty Investigation Code will rule 
and dominate in respect to any obligation of the flag State to carry out the marine safety 
investigation (IMO, 2008). Therefore, identifying the root and immediate factors that 
caused the accident in a scientific way through collecting the data, analyzing the 
scenarios and identifying the sequence of the event is the necessary way to reduce 
accidents and future risks (Roed-Larsen & Stoop, 2011).  
 
The use of adequate measures and a systematic approach may make a major 
contribution to diminish the risks or minimize damages or unacceptable major impacts 
generated from accidents (Roed-Larsen & Stoop, 2011). 
 
In Instruction 2007, JMC was set out clearly the main objective of conducting 
marine casualty investigations in order to prevent future incidents occurring (JMC, 
2007). However, after the IMSAS audit it was noticed that Instruction 2017, which is 
issued as a corrective action did not mention the purpose for conducting marine casualty 
investigations (JMC, 2017). 
 
From the above, the importance of carrying out marine casualty investigations for 
developing sufficient measures to prevent and avoid future casualties is understood. The 
following sections will highlight by comparing different States and Jordan current 
practices on these matters. In particular the marine casualty concept and scope, in both 
the mandatory and recommended standards in the Casualty Investigation Code, 2008. 
It should highlighted States Such as the Republic of Marshall Island (RMI), the 
United States’ (US) Coast Guard, and Poland as a member State in the European Union 
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(EU). Whereas, EU regulations apply directly in EU member States. These States 
showed a logic implementing and well transforming of the Casualty Investigation Code 
provisions into each States’ laws and national regulations to meet the international 
obligations and national needs.  
 
3.2 Understanding the marine casualty concept and scope  
This part commences with highlight the definition of marine casualty, which 
leads to determining the responsibilities of those involved in the casualties or agencies 
that have to investigate the accidents. Whereas, the small difference in the given 
definitions between the States regulations provokes different responsibilities for the 
parties involved in the marine investigation process. Thus, these various definitions lead 
to enhancing the understanding of the concept of the marine casualty investigation as a 
common process requiring collaboration and coordination among parties.  
 
According to Article 2.9 in Chapter 2 – Definition of the Casualty Investigation 
Code, the marine casualty can be defined as any event resulting from an occurrence 
linked to operations connected to the ship (IMO, 2008). These occurrences are clearly 
stated as loss, death, or serious injury to a person on the ship; the loss, or abandonment 
or any material damage of a ship or serious threat to the safety of the ship; ship collision; 
severe damage to the environment, caused by a vessel or damage to a vessel (IMO, 
2008).  
 
Concurrently, in Article 2.9 of the code excludes any neglect acts or the sequence 
of the neglect acts that linked to operations connected cause damage to the ship is not 
encompassed under the marine casualty definition (IMO, 2008). In addition, the 
Casualty Investigation Code gives specific and clear definitions of serious injury and 
26 
 
severe damage, to avoid inaccurate implementation of the provisions of this Code (IMO, 
2008).  
 
The US Coast Guard identified in its national regulations that the only marine 
casualties that it will investigate are reported casualties because the government does not 
have the resources to investigate all marine casualties (McNamara, 2016). Therefore, the 
US Coast Guard regulations limited the definition the notion of “serious marine 
incident” as a marine casualty that caused or linked to a vessel, which is the reported one 
(McNamara, 2016).  
 
A deeper understanding of the marine casualty concept and scope clarified the 
investigation scope in US Coast Guard. Which ship is applicable to investigate 
according to the Casualty Investigation Code in the US? The US Coast Guard has 
determined in its national regulations the category of targeted vessels that are 
geographically investigated, those include, but are not limited to, US ships anywhere and 
vessels flying foreign flags in navigable waters of the US (McNamara, 2016). 
 
The US Coast Guard has not complied with the definition stated in the Casualty 
Investigation Code. However, in accordance with its national requirements, the US 
Coast Gard laws have adapted the definition to suit what is required in its national needs.  
  
EU is issued directives, which it should need to be transposed into national 
legislation of the EU member States as Poland. Article 3.2 of the Directive 2009/18/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009, Says That these terms 
“marine casualty, very serious casualty, marine incident, marine casualty or incident 
safety investigation, lead investigating State, and substantially interested State” should 
be understood according to the Casualty Investigation Code (EU, 2009). As well as, 
Article 3.3 of the Directive 2009/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
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of 23 April 2009, Says That “serious casualty” definition should be consistent with the 
definition of IMO and that updated with one included in MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.3 (EU, 
2009).  
 
Poland is transposed the mentioned above directive into its national legislation. 
According to Luczywek (2017), in the Polish Act, Article 2, in the definition of “a very 
serious casualty”, a marine casualty implies the death of a person, a vessel total loss and 
harmful environmental damage, which has results such as; any damage that makes the 
vessel unseaworthy, or causes environmental pollution, or any severe damage requiring 
towage the vessel. The Polish Act maintains the definition of a “marine incident” as 
stated in the Casualty Investigation Code provisions (Łuczywek, 2017). 
 
Jordan’s regulations do not mention the "maritime accident" or "marine 
incidents" concepts because the JMC is content with indicating in the Jordanian 
regulation, Article 3, that Jordan applies the Casualty Investigation Code and considers 
the provisions of the code as integral parts of the JMC regulations. In other words, 
Jordan omitted to set its own definition in harmony with Jordanian national requirements 
(JMC, 2017).   
 
From above despite some States replicating the same definition of the marine 
casualty concept from the Casualty Investigation Code into their national legislation. 
However, these States try to meet international obligations by commensurate with 
national needs. The such stated of the marine casualty concept or define the 
investigation scope is considered as the right action to ensure the minimum requirements 
from the international obligations so even if it is replication so it is enough to let the 
national maritime community understand that the State has the legislation that stated the 




From above the right understanding of the marine casualty concept and the well, 
define the marine investigation scope lead to an effective investigation. Therefore, each 
variation and refinement of the term “marine casualty” will serve a particular national 
need and fulfil international obligations. This understanding will help the investigators 
to start the effective investigation process and methodology. 
 
3.3 Casualty investigation process and methodology 
The investigations of maritime accidents are considered to be more than a means 
of identifying the causes of maritime accidents. Rather, the marine accident investigation 
is considered as a means of identifying safety deficiencies in the overall management of 
the operation from policy to implementation by resorting to the concept of investigation 
analysis by applying the clear process and methodologies, which depend on the 
scientific methods (IMO, 2008).  
 
Resolution A.1075 (28) on Guidelines to help investigators in the 
implementation of the Casualty Investigation Code (Resolution MSC.255 (84)) 
identifies the extent of the maritime safety investigation by five areas: people, 
environment, equipment, processes and procedures, and organization and external 
influences. Thus, safety investigations are sufficient to meet maritime safety standards 
(IMO, 2014). 
 
By drawing on the concept of safety analysis, IMO has been able to set out in 
Resolution A.1075(28), (2014) accident causation models such as a combination safety 
analysis and reconstruction of the casualty, that are directly connected with 
reconstruction events (IMO, 2014). The resolution A.1075(28), (2014) highlights other 
efficiency safety analysis tools, which can be deducted from causation models of 
accidents, such as deeper questioning and direct communication and investigation of 
29 
 
indirect or hidden causes, to enhance the development at all appropriate levels of 
effective corrective action (IMO, 2014). However, this resolution does not obligate 
States to use specific tools.  
 
Nonetheless, it is known that the investigators may use the accident causation 
models to achieve optimal investigation. Then, the main question is whether the marine 
accident investigators in JMC apply accident causation models. If the answer is yes, 
which models are used? Before elucidating on this, a summary of accident investigation 
procedure and methodology will be discussed in general. 
 
Figure 4 shows investigation procedures in line with the Casualty Investigation 
Code, according to Soliwoda (2014). Soliwoda undertook preliminary work on the 
procedures by dividing marine casualty investigations into three steps. The first step is 
data collection, which involves developing a sequence of events through the collection 
of information. Subsequently, the second step is the classification of the causation 
factors. In this step, the unsafe conditions and circumstances can be identified by expert 
investigators by determining the working environmental causation factors. Finally, the 
third step is to reduce the possibilities of accidents related to human errors and vessel 
machinery by developing safety actions. It is required to identify the possible safety 







Soliwoda (2014) examines the significance of models in the vessel casualty 
process and identifies the major causation factors that might cause identified unsafe acts 
to occur. These systematic models, including the SHELL Model, the Cognitive Process 
Model, and Marine Root Cause Analysis Technique (MaRCAT), designed by American 
Bureau of Shipping (ABS), help the investigators to identify the errors that may be 
occurring in the whole process in the system (Soliwoda, 2014).  
 
Cassama (2015) provided an in-depth elaboration of the casualty investigation 
process and methods. Initially, the study pointed out that the investigation procedures 
begin before the arrival of investigators to the marine casualty scene. A meeting is 
initially held to facilitate the exchange of knowledge among investigators and the 
development of the investigation plan, especially if there is more than one State 




The collection of factual evidence of importance to the course of the 
investigation should be considered. This may include witness statements through 
interviews. In addition, a review of records, documents and material evidence, such as 
the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR), should be undertaken (Cassama, 2015).  
 
The next step is to assess the factors that contributed to the accident, such as the 
safety management system of the ship through its policy and implementation. In 
addition, the context of human factors involving interactions among machines, the crew, 
and the management system should be considered (Cassama, 2015). 
 
According to Cassama (2015), the root cause of the incident can be identified by 
reconstructing and linking events. This is called a sequential description of events to 
identify information gaps and inconsistencies in the evidence and factors that 
contributed to the accident. It is possible in this step to use different causal models of 
accidents as tools for safety analysis. The final version of the maritime safety 
investigation report should be released at this stage (Cassama, 2015). 
 
Interestingly, it was observed that whether the investigation is simple or 
complex, the investigation model helps to focus on the object of the investigation. 
Moreover, the model helps to find out the cause of the accident by direct investigation 
using scientific methods (Cassama, 2015). Cassama shows two kinds of investigation 
models. The first is the traditional models and the second is the system theory approach. 
The most commonly used investigation models are the SHELL model and Reason based 
model. 
 
As well as, Article 5.4 - Obligation to Investigate of the Directive 2009/18/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009. In this article, the EU 
obliged all investigative bodies in all EU member States to investigate according to the 
32 
 
common approach adopted. In some cases, to achieve the investigation purposes that 
rely on professional judgment can the investigators leave the common approach (EU, 
2009). 
 
EU is strived to develop the adopted a common marine casualty investigation 
methodology. In pursuant of Article 5.4 - Obligation to Investigate of the Commission 
Regulation (EU) No 1286/2011 of 9 December 2011, EU defines the common 
methodology is started by operational readiness as a preparedness plan to ensure that 
unnecessary delays. Initial assessment and response are considered as a critical step to 
quick response with possibilities to minimize losses. Setting out a strategy for scope, 
timing, and direction of the investigation to collect the evidence. Moreover, looking for 
the proper analysis to identify the causation and other contributing factors to take the 
corrective action. Finally, the safety recommendations are highly needed (EU, 2011).   
 
As mentioned above, one phase of marine casualty investigation According to 
EU Directives is collecting the data. EU has obliged the investigation bodies for EU 
member States to obtain the information from the VDR. Therefore, the investigators 
should ensure the VDR information is saved to check all the information related to the 
marine accident (EU, 2011). These Directives have been transposed in Polish law in the 
following manner:  
 
Strong evidence was observed in the Polish Statute, through a detailed 
examination of the casualty investigation process and methods by Łuczywek (2017). 
Moreover, the investigation process requires the investigators to go far beyond direct 
evidence of the circumstances during the investigation to prevent future casualties. In 
addition, the Polish Statute, as well as the resolution A.1075 (28) identify the scope of 
any maritime safety investigation by five areas: people, environment, equipment, 




Hence, the Polish Statute illustrates the investigation process, starting with 
accessing the location of the maritime accident; collecting the data and making the 
proper analysis. Then, a request is made to the chairman of the commission for the 
necessary surveys, and permission to conduct the marine investigation. The investigators 
should have access to documents, information and data. Furthermore, they should have 
the right to copy the important data or take a copy of VDR recorders. The investigators 
should interview the crewmembers and employees on board that were involved in the 
maritime accident. Finally, information and documents relating to the vessel inspection 
should be obtained (Łuczywek, 2017). 
 
In order to reconstruct how a casualty has happened, it is sometimes necessary to 
conduct a specialized systematic analysis. For instance, for a specialist analysis of 
weather and sea conditions at the time and place of the casualty, the Polish Statute gives 
the commission the right to cooperate with institutes such as the Institute of Meteorology 
and Water Management – National Research Institute (IMGW) (Łuczywek, 2017).  
 
In contrast, in relation to Jordan’s implementation of the Casualty Investigation 
Code, 2008, Jordan has been found to conform to the quality management system 
standards consistent with the management system certificate, International 
Standardization Organization (ISO 9001:2015). JMC issued the process manual (2018), 
shown in Figure 5, containing the JMC procedures for conducting a maritime 
investigation. Sections 049 and 153 of the process manual contain the procedures to 
carry out the investigation of a maritime accident occurring in Jordanian territorial 
waters or on board a vessel flying the Jordanian flag, wherever it may be (JMC, 2018).  
 
Sections 049 and 153 in JMC Process Manual 2018, indicates that the master, 
agent owner, manager, operator, or person in charge of the vessel shall notify the 
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administrator in any instance of an occurrence of a maritime accident. The investigator 
starts the investigation procedures immediately by gathering the information and 
evidence to identify the reasons and the root cause of events to make the proper 
recommendations to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future (JMC, 2018). 
Similarly, In addition, the IMO audit report was recommended that JMC should 
implement, establishes policies and procedures with respect to the Casualty Investigation 
Code and relevant resolutions (IMO, 2016).  
 
Moreover, concerning the information, data or records obtained during the 
investigation. The Instructions 2007 stated that this evidence must not be disclosed for 
purposes other than an investigation and only with the consent of the party providing the 
information. Moreover, JMC decides how much information can be included in the final 
report (JMC, 2007). The instruction 2017 revoked the Instruction 2007 in regard to data 
and record handling.  
 
The investigator issues the final investigation report and submits the report to the 
Director-General of JMC. The report should be entered into the Global Integrated 
Shipping Information System (GISIS) - a marine casualty and incident module, and a 








From the previous part of this Chapter, while implementing the documented 
investigation process. The investigators should rely on scientific models as Cassama, 
(2015) stated a different kind of models such as the SHELL model and Reason based 
model. Therefore, for a significant role of these models, IMO resolutions and various 
studies regarding the casualty investigation highlighted some models that help the 
investigators to find the causation factors that led to a marine casualty.   
 
3.3.1 Casualty Investigation models   
To maintain ship safety improvement, IMO adopted a common approach for the 
marine casualty investigation process. If each investigator uses an individual approach to 
the marine investigation process, standardization of casualty investigations will not be 
obtained (Cassama, 2015). Therefore, accident investigation techniques and mechanisms 
are adapted by using common methods, which should build on a model to support the 
analysis process. This will achieve the goal of unifying investigative methods. One can 
also say, the accident causation methods help gather data in conjunction with the 
accidents models approach (Cassama, 2015). 
 
To prevent similar casualties in the future, resolution A.1075 (28) was intended 
to draw guidelines recommending the States to adopt a systematic investigation of 
marine casualties and develop an effective analysis and preventive action (IMO, 2014). 
Thus, a significant definition of “casual factor” was illustrated in the Casualty 
Investigation Code (2008) as actions, neglect, events, circumstances causing a marine 
casualty, or marine incident to occur or probably occur as well as the adverse 
consequences linked with the marine casualty or marine incident (IMO, 2008).  
 
The Casualty Investigation Code was not limited to this definition. It also defined 
the five terms, the contributing factors, safety deficiency and issue. That affects the 
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sequence of events leading to a casualty occurrence, and how it should be classified 






A Danish accident that occurred on 15 July 2009, elaborates the necessity to 
identify the causal factor is an increasingly important reason to apply the investigation 
Models. The primary purpose is to prevent recurrence of similar accidents when the 
investigators identify the causal factors. For instance, according to Hedlund (2017), this 
accident that occurred during the passage of the Baltic Sea. The accident resulted of two 
seamen died from carbon monoxide poisoning. Because of a lack of ability to identify 
the causation factors and no indication of wrongdoing, the investigation was closed. 
Moreover, the investigation findings were kept out of reach (Hedlund, 2017). Therefore, 
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no lessons were learned, and other fatal accidents later took place in Denmark (Hedlund, 
2017). 
 
The majority of maritime casualties are caused by human factors/errors. To 
investigate the root causes related to the human factor (Lee, 2016), the SHELL model, 
used in the data collection phase, and the Reason Hybrid model, used in the analysis 
phase, are highlighted.  
 
The SHELL model deployed by The International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) is a simple model to provide assistance in investigating the effects of human 
error on the maritime casualty, describing and building an understanding of how the 
human element interactions with technical systems components. SHELL stands for 
Software, Hardware, Environment, Liveware (central component), and Liveware 
(peripheral). Therefore, this model can be used to provide guidelines on where the 
investigators should look for evidence. It helps with the “who”, “where”, and “what” 
(Lee, 2016).  
 
The Reason Hybrid Model is an epidemiological model that focuses on analysing 
the “How” and “Why" to identify the unsafe conditions considered causation factors that 
contributes to the maritime casualty. This model uses the data collected by the SHELL 
model concerning the event and circumstances in relation to five elements: decision 
makers, line management, preconditions, productive activities, and defence (Lee, 2016).  
 
The IMO audit report advised Jordan to determine and assign responsibility for 
the development of methodologies and evaluation criteria to give full implementation to 
the applicable Casualty Investigation Code (IMO, 2016). Therefore, the IMO audit 
report recommended that JMC should establish a policy consisting of guidelines, 
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processes, procedures, and key performance indicators, combined with a Quality 
Management System (QMS) (IMO, 2016). 
 
JMC’s procedure for conducting a maritime investigation is shown in Figure 5. 
However, the stated procedure is superficial and ambiguous.  For example, it requires 
analyzing the root causes of the marine casualty, without specifying procedures or 
providing models for the conduct of such an analysis (JMC, 2018).  
 
The investigation models in IMO Resolution and the Casualty Investigation 
Code is stated clearly. In spite of that, the evidence presented in this section suggests 
that JMC’s process manual 2018, tries to determine its casualty investigation process 
and methodology superficially. Moreover, far too little attention has been paid to state 
the casualty investigation process even in the national regulations or clarify it more 
accurate in the JMC process manual. 
After the investigators defined, the causation factors that led to the accident by 
collected the data and analyzed it based on the scientific models. The investigators now 
are ready to write and prepare the casualty investigation report. This report should 
comply with the Casualty Investigation Code and the related resolutions.   
3.3.2 Casualty Investigation Report  
Timely and accurate marine casualty reporting as a remedial action is an 
important part in the casualty investigation process and plays a key role in improving 
maritime safety to prevent and reduce anticipated risks resulting from similar accidents 
in the future (Łuczywek, 2017).  
 
The Casualty Investigation Code deals with the marine safety investigation 
report through the mandatory part and the recommended practices part. The mandatory 
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part obliges each State to send a copy of a draft marine investigation report to whoever 
is interested, giving them thirty days to comment. This includes stakeholders such as the 
flag State of the ship or the coastal State involved in the casualty or whose environment 
was damaged by a marine casualty. In addition to that, a State that has lost the lives of 
its nationals or a state with any other reason considered significant by the marine 
casualty investigation may comment on the report. However, when the 30 days has 
expired, no comments will be considered (IMO, 2008). 
 
It is worth mentioning that the IMO sought opportunities to learn lessons from 
marine incidents, casualties and accidents. IMO circular MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.4 requires 
that the final marine safety investigation report be entered for on-line reporting directly 
and electronically into the marine casualties and incidents module in GISIS (IMO, 
2013).  
 
Each State is obliged to submit the final copy of the investigation report to IMO 
for each investigation into a serious marine casualty or a casualty or incident other than a 
serious casualty that may prevent a similar casualty in the future. This report shall be 
available to the public with details (IMO, 2008). 
 
According to Łuczywek, (2017) The Polish Law 2012 abides by the Code and 
show strong transformation for the International obligations into the Polish legislation. 
More detailed in the legal provisions to oblige the investigation body, which is the 
Commission, to prepare and publish the final marine casualty report. Moreover, define 
the structure of the report to include the basic facts injured persons, environment 
pollution, flag State of the vessel, classification society, operator and the owner of the 
vessel, and vessel information such as the size and the crew member information. In 
addition, to be included are the accident sequence description, the models and methods 
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used for the analysis to define the causation factors and the results and safety 
recommendations (Łuczywek, 2017). 
 
The EU Directive 2009/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 April 2009, says that under this Directive shall ensure the accurate and timely 
reporting. This investigation should not determine any blame or liabilities. However, 
shall be proposed remedial actions (EU, 2009). 
 
One of the significant issues in Poland is transposed, EU Directive 2009/18/EC 
into the Polish Law. The Polish Law stated in the provisions, is that the marine casualty 
report should be published within twelve months of the marine casualty. Moreover, the 
report should not consider as evidence in criminal or other proceedings (Łuczywek, 
2017). The Casualty Investigation Code states that the investigation report is not aimed 
at determining blame or liability (IMO, 2008). In case of safety deficiencies creating 
serious risk, the investigators immediately inform the responsible party, so the risk can 
be managed. (Łuczywek, 2017). Moreover, the Commission follows up every 
recommendation after submitting the final report and promotes positive safety actions 
taken by making it public (Łuczywek, 2017). 
 
Formerly in Jordan, JMC Instruction 2007 stated that it is obligatory to send a 
copy of the final report of the marine casualty investigation to the relevant States and to 
IMO (JMC, 2007). However, the Instructions 2017 did not mention any specific or clear 
provisions obliging the JMC to send a copy of the final investigation report (JMC, 
2017).  
 
However, it is mentioned in the Process Manual 2018, that the investigators 
should prepare a marine casualty investigation report and submit a copy to the Director-
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General of JMC and a copy to IMO, by submitting the report to the GISIS module 
(JMC, 2018). 
 
Additionally, the IMO audit report recommended that the safety 
recommendations of the final investigation report be publicized and the investigation 
report submitted to IMO through the GISIS Module (IMO, 2016). See Appendix 2 (FD-
8). 
 
According to JMC investigation records, the investigation division of JMC has 
carried out 34 safety investigations (JMC, 2019), published no (0) marine safety 
investigation reports to JMC’s website and submitted two safety investigation reports to 
the GISIS module (JMC, 2019). 
 
Another major source of uncertainty is in the way a marine casualty investigation 
report is used in Jordan. If we look at Poland how dealt with the EU Directives and the 
Casualty Investigation. Poland has stated the marine casualty investigation report more 
accurately in Polish law. This way gives the impression of effectiveness in the 
implementation and stresses the extent of Poland’s commitment to the code provisions. 
In contrast to the Polish case, Jordan dealt with the code through one-provision, stating 
that Jordan is obliged to follow the requirements of the code. However, Jordan does not 
refer to the investigation report in its law or regulations generally or in detail. Only the 
JMC process manual refers to the obligation to prepare an investigation report without 
indicating any details such as the type of accidents or ship type. 
 
3.4 Summary and Conclusions 
As noted from above, Jordan, represented by JMC as the maritime 
administration, did not establish a specific definition of maritime casualties. It merely 
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stated one provision, namely that the code is an integral part of the marine investigation 
instructions in Jordan. Therefore, JMC has left the involved entities to interpret and 
estimate the provisions of the casualty investigation code in a way that suits them. For 
instance, it would be difficult for them to know how marine casualties are defined or 
which casualties JMC would investigate.  
 
However, it is noted from the practical cases discussed above that some States 
have clearly stated the definition of marine casualty, and specified which cases require 
investigation in their national regulations and law in accordance with the national 
requirements of the State. Consequently, these States are clear and firm in their 
regulations, demonstarting their committment to abide by the national regulations and 
fulfil their international obligations. 
 
As for the investigation process and methodology, Jordan has shown 
documentation of the investigation process in the approved processe manual 2018, 
which is a positive aspect. However, when the logs of investigation process were 
reviewed, it was noted that JMC did not document in detail its procedures of any of the 
models for determining causation factors in a maritime accident. Thus, without working 
and inference by these systematic and scientific models, which is recommended by IMO 
in its resolutions, it would be difficult for marine investigators in Jordan to identify the 
causation factors of an accident. 
 
At the end of this Chapter, it was discussed that Jordan, as a member State, has 
not fully complied with the decision of the IMO convetions and resolutions to provide it 
with marine investigation reports or at least to publish them on the JMC website to 




The investigation process and methodologies should be implemented effectively. 
Therefore, there are many factors that should be considered to achieve the main aim 
from the marine investigation. The next Chapter will address the contributing factors 









4. Chapter 4 Contributing factors in marine investigations   
To carry out the maritime accident investigation process and come up with a 
final report requires suitable maritime safety recommendations that help to prevent the 
recurrence of marine casualties in the future. In this case, the investigation process 
requires some factors to have an effectiveness investigation. For example, it should be 
an accredited body that carries out the responsibilities of the marine casualty 
investigation process in which maritime investigators are competent, experienced and 
have the necessary authorities or delegations to enable them to implement and meet the 
international State’s obligations of the requirements of the Casualty Investigation Code. 
 
These factors are stated in the provisions of the Casualty Investigation Code. 
Thus, this Chapter will address these factors, whose presence is seen as a contribution to 
the success of the marine casualty investigation. Moreover, this Chapter will address 
Jordan’s status with respect to these factors to fulfil its obligations. Moreover, the 
Chapter discusses how some other cases have provided these factors to facilitate the 
casualty investigation process and have fully met their international obligations by 




4.1 Casualty Investigators 
In the view of Nuutinen & Norros (2007), the nature of carrying out an 
investigation process is described as a retrospective process (Nuutinen & Norros, 2007). 
In other words, a primary concern involves rebuilding the sequence of events. To that 
end, key abilities in respect of identifying the root causation leading to a maritime 
casualty are being knowledgeable about data collection and evidence-gathering 
mechanisms and interview techniques as well as methods of analysis by identification of 
human and organizational factors and by applying the casual factor models to marine 
accidents (IMO, 2014). This investigation process requires a qualified, well-trained and 
competent marine investigator to be able to achieve a systematic investigation to 
improve maritime safety and prevent similar casualties in the future (IMO, 2014). 
 
IMO in the Casualty Investigation Code and related Resolutions does not specify 
the type or quality of the training or the degree of the qualifications that the investigators 
should possess. It only states that they should be adequate and sufficient to the marine 
casualty areas. This has been left for each State to decide according to its national 
capabilities (IMO, 2014). 
 
So far, two factors have been identified as being potentially important: 
qualifications and sufficient training. IMO is keen in the guidelines Resolution 
A.1075(28) to assist investigators in the implementation of the casualty investigation 
code.  For qualified and well-trained investigators, the marine safety investigation body 
should set out a specialized training program (IMO, 2014).  
 
Article 10.3(g) - EU Directives 2009/18/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 23 April 2009, says that EU member States should provide relevant 
training for the investigators (EU, 2009). A notable example is Poland by transposed the 
EU Directives into the national legislation and was more precise and detailed in terms of 
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determining the qualifications and degree of education and what specialization of the 
qualification the maritime investigator must hold. Furthermore, it specifies what 
knowledge the investigator must possess in safety of navigation and protection of the 
marine environment, with at least five years’ experience, to be a member of the 
commission formed to investigate a marine casualty. In addition, it is important that the 
investigator be a Polish citizen, have the full legal capacity and not be guilty by final 
judgment of any crime intentionally (Łuczywek, 2017). 
 
Similarly, Jordan has set out the qualifications of the marine investigator at the 
JMC to have a Master’s degree in maritime affairs or marine qualification, either first 
marine engineer or master or second marine engineer. Moreover, the investigator should 
have serviced as a marine engineer or master on board a merchant’s vessel for fifteen 
years and had experience as a flag State surveyor or port State officer for at least one 
year (JMC, 2018).  
 
In addition to the above criteria, JMC stipulated that the investigators which 
likely will hire should have sufficient knowledge of the laws and regulations issued by 
the IMO. This condition is stated in the job description card, that is issued by JMC and 
accredited by the Civil Service Bureau (CSB). The CSB is the responsible body for 
managing human resources and organizing the governmental employee's affairs in 
Jordan (JMC, 2018). 
 
To ensure the effectiveness of the investigation process according to the Casualty 
Investigation Code, the administration is entitled, if it deems necessary, to use 
temporarily qualified and expert investigators or use consultants to obtain expert advice 
on any aspect of the marine safety investigation. Those experts should investigate in 




This can be seen in RMI; the RMIs’ maritime regulations generally determine 
that the deputy commissioner with supervisory expertise and carrying out a maritime 
investigation retains the full powers to assign an officer for the purpose of carrying out 
the marine investigation (Republic of Marshall Island, 2015). As necessary, the RMI 
maritime regulations state that to obtain additional assistance, get technical advice or 
assist in the Investigation, the senior deputy commissioner or the deputy commissioner 
may appoint individuals, organizations or agencies with the appropriate expertise 
(Republic of Marshall Island, 2015). 
 
The presence of specialized, qualified and experienced investigators contributes 
greatly to the effective investigation in general (Roed-Larsen & Stoop, 2011), whereas 
the lack of these factors, whether the expertise in the field, specialized and continuous 
training in modern investigative techniques may hinder the investigation (Roed-Larsen 
& Stoop, 2011). As a result, the effectiveness of the investigation will be significantly 
affected, jeopardizing the main objective of ensuring maritime safety (Roed-Larsen & 
Stoop, 2011). 
 
It is worth mentioning that JMC instruction 2007 stated that a committee formed 
of members including investigators of JMC, a member of the Royal Jordanian Navy 
Force and an investigator from ACPOM carries out investigations of marine casualties 
on a small ship. Moreover, the JMC Director-General shall be entitled to seek such 
assistance, as deems appropriate to assist in the investigation if required (JMC, Marine 
Investigation Ins., 2007). However, this article no longer exists in the new instructions 





According to Salman (2019)2 the Director of Technical Affairs and Marine 
Safety Directorate, JMC shows that in some investigation cases, such as the M/V Pella 
investigation (JMC, 2011) a temporary investigator or private company can be hired to 
assist with issues related to VDR (Salman, 2019). However, after checking to try to find 
a provision in the JMC's laws, regulations or procedures, there was no evidence 
mentioned in relation to the opportunity to have external assistance in conducting a 
marine casualty investigation.  
 
JMC has benefited from training courses, and programs offered by maritime 
organizations specialized in training, whether IMO or European Maritime Safety 
Agency (EMSA), to ensure maritime safety. Therefore, JMC has dispatched its only 
marine investigator to attend specialized training courses and workshops in the maritime 
field. For this matter, the training records related to the marine investigator were 
reviewed in JMC (JMC, 2007-2019). It was noted that the total number of training 
courses held and utilized during 2018-2019 was four comprehensive training courses in 
various maritime topics through external courses and workshops (JMC, 2007-2019). 
 
IMO audit report 2016 recommended that JMC should ensure the impartiality of 
the investigation by exclusive investigators properly trained and supported by sufficient 
resources (IMO, 2016). 
 
In JMC, a holistic approach is utilized by integrating investigator qualifications 
and sufficient training to meet its obligations in respect to the Casualty Investigation 
Code 2008. This finding may help to understand that Jordan has a strong point in the 
marine investigation.  
                                                      






4.2 Casualty Investigation Body  
4.2.1 Power of the investigators 
According to the Casualty Investigation Code, (2008), all States shall provide in 
their national laws to ensure investigators that perform a maritime safety investigation 
have the authority and powers to carry out their duties and accomplish the investigation 
process. This includes the ability to board the vessel and meet the master, crew and any 
other involved person to obtain evidence for the purpose of the investigation without any 
hindrance (IMO, 2008). 
 
A qualified and well-trained investigator will not be able to carry out the 
investigation to facilitate and meet the State's obligations with respect to the Casualty 
Investigation Code requirements without adequate human and financial resources (IMO, 
2008). 
 
According to Polish law, the Commission, which carries out the investigation, is 
obliged to investigate every serious injury. After a preliminary assessment of the causes, 
the Commission has the right to decide either to proceed or to abandon it. When making 
a decision, it shall take into account the seriousness of the accident, the type of the 
implicated vessel or cargo, and whether the results of the investigation shall contribute 
in the future to the prevention of marine accidents (Łuczywek, 2017). 
 
As a good case that shows the importance of drawing the lines of power through 
the regulations, we recall the case of the RMI. Under RMI Law, it has been generally 
indicated that marine investigations are carried out in RMI under the RMI Maritime 
Regulations, which are promulgated under the Maritime Act 1990 of the RMI and issued 
by the maritime administrator. The RMI marine investigations are aimed to enhance the 
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safety of life, property, and marine pollution at sea by preventing offences, marine 
incidents, marine casualties and future accidents (Republic of Marshall Island, 2015).  
 
The Maritime Regulations in RMI limit some of the investigator's powers by 
stating certain functions and excluding others. For instance, in dealing with original 
equipment and documents, the investigator shall not be authorized to take them off a 
vessel unless the marine safety investigation authority. The body responsible for 
carrying out the investigation in RMI indicates fundamental legal reasons for why it is 
necessary to take the original documents or remove equipment from the vessel (Republic 
of Marshall Island, 2015). 
 
The enactment and enforcement of the international instruments through national 
laws, is giving the States the power and the authorization to ensure the maritime safety 
by implementing the casualty investigation procedures (Pomeroy & Earthy, 2017). This 
is evident in both cases Poland and RMI because they have clear and explicit articles in 
the regulations. However, does this mean the limitation of some powers or 
authorizations of the investigators are considered as a weak point in some casualty 
investigation regulations? Of course, the answer is no. The existence of explicit legal 
provisions, this will give the powers to all parties involved in the investigation process, 
whether they are managers of the top levels, investigators, master of the ship or the 
crewmembers. This leads to a clear understanding of the responsibilities assigned to the 
investigators. In this case, there will be no lack of awareness of the responsibilities 
assigned and does not lead to nescience in practicing the roles. 
 
In Jordan, according to Article 20, JMC Law 46 states that for the purpose of 
implementing the provisions of this law, the Director-General of JMC, or the employee 
commissioned by him, shall be considered a Judicial Police authorization. Moreover, 
this provision in the JMC Law 64, grants the investigators the power to inspect and enter 
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anywhere in the ports and on board ships and review the documents and express 
reservation on any of them (JMC, 2006).  
 
However, under Jordanian governmental policies, the elements of this doctrine 
were established in a different way. It is generally thought that the decision of the 
Jordanian Prime Ministry started the development of good faith in economic 
performance in Jordan. The council decided to adopt a policy of rationalization and 
adjustment of expenditures, including travel expenditures, in all governmental bodies’ 
budgets, including JMC budget. (Prime Minister Council, 2017).   
 
According to (Abu Zeid, 2019), such a decision has limited the investigators' 
ability to travel to investigate any maritime casualty occurring on board a vessel flying 
the Jordanian flag in another coastal State. The procedure to travel for the purpose of 
investigating on board a Jordanian vessel in another country will require a lot of time to 
obtain permission. Abu Zied (2019) also stated that in such cases, the Jordanian flag 
State must request a copy of the investigation report from the coastal State involved in 
the marine casualty.  
 
Despite the Judicial Police authorization was granted to the investigators in 
Jordan. The investigators will not be able to investigate a national ship that involves 
accidents in international waters. Interestingly, the authorization granted to the 
investigators in Jordan was observed to be limited.  
 
4.2.2 Independent Investigation Body  
The importance of the investigative process and the noble goal of increasing 
maritime safety. The independence and objectivity of the investigators are also 
considered to be major and pivotal aspects related to the marine casualty investigation 
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process. The objectivity factor is deemed as an influencer that may affect the 
investigation and thus depart from the main objective of the investigation report 
(Syafiuddin, 2016).  
 
IMO has made a recommendation in Part III on recommended practices, Chapter 
16 - principles of investigation according to the Casualty Investigation Code, (2008). It 
is stated that the investigation body should be independent to ensure the free flow of 
information during the marine casualty investigation; such an investigation should be 
independent and impartial. To ensure this result, the investigators must be functionally 
independent of the parties involved in the maritime incident, independent from judicial 
proceedings, independent from anyone who may take rigid action against individuals or 
organizations linked to the maritime incident (IMO, 2008). 
 
These investigators according to the recommendation of the Casualty 
Investigation Code, (2008) should also be free from any intrusion with deference to the 
investigation process (IMO, 2008), which is illustrated in Chapter 3.1: Casualty 
investigation process and methodology. 
 
According to Syafiuddin (2016), a conflict of interest might exist if the maritime 
administration, as a regulatory body, is likely to conduct the casualty investigation. This 
is because the maritime administration may be related to the involved entities being 
investigated, which is an obstacle to their independence and objectivity as an 
investigative body (Syafiuddin, 2016). 
 
Some states have adopted and maintained the principle of independence and 
objectivity by forming independent investigative bodies in their governments, as Poland 




In this aspect, there are no conflicts of interest within the investigating body in 
Poland. The Parliament of the EU obliges the Member States to establish an independent 
and impartial investigation body to conduct marine safety investigations, with the 
necessary powers and resources (EU, 2009). Poland, in 2013, complied with the 
directives of the EU as a Member State and established an independent body called 
“Państwowa Komisja Badania Wypadków Morskich” [the State Marine Accident 
Investigation Commission] (Łuczywek, 2017). Therefore, Poland provided a prominent 
example in making the responsible body to carry out a casualty investigation by forming 
a lasting and independent body, which consists of five members appointed for five years 
(Łuczywek, 2017).  
 
This trend has also been applied in Indonesia since 1999, where an independent 
body separate from the maritime administration has been established to conduct casualty 
investigations, called KNKT [Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi]. KNKT is 
under the responsibility of the MOT, but the Minister has no authority to intervene in its 
investigations (Syafiuddin, 2016). 
 
In Jordan, as shown in Figure 7, the Accident Investigation and Marine Incidents 
Division reports to the Technical Affairs and Maritime Safety Directorate, which in turn 
reports to JMCs' Director-General and then the Minister of Transport (JMC, 2014). The 
Accident Investigation and Marine Incidents Division has no independent decision-









IMO audit report 2016 also indicated that there was no evidence of independence 
or impartiality measures concerning investigators and investigations conducted by JMC 
(IMO, 2016).  
 
Roed-Larsen and Stoops’ (2011) study have shown that institutional and 
administrative relationships between different entities may restrict the independence of 
the investigation. In addition, the study shows that this issue is found in modern 
investigations in various fields of transport, whether maritime or aviation or land or 




In some rare cases, Even the State provided an independent body for the 
investigation. However, the States should be careful about how to ensure the impartiality 
for the investigators. It should be noted; this independence poses a major challenge in its 
continuity in maintaining the independence and the absence of any external influence 
affecting the integrity of the independence factor of these institutions (Roed-Larsen & 
Stoop, 2011). For instance, The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the US 
was established as an independent body under the Ministry of Transport (Forbes, 2011). 
However, some political appointments interests have influenced the selection of judges, 
which in turn, affected the objectivity and independence of this institution (Roed-Larsen 
& Stoop, 2011). 
 
The question remains in this study, whether Jordan’s investigation body should 
be independent or non-independent? It is highly recommended to make the Marine 
Accident and Incidents Investigation Division an independent body from JMC. 
Therefore, it is essential to provide impartiality and objectivity for the investigators to 
carry out the investigation process and contribute effectively to the real purpose of the 
marine casualty investigation process. 
 
The IMSAS audit report recommended that JMC should undertake initial work to 
separate the investigation functions from JMC in order to demonstrate impartiality and 
independence in marine casualty investigations. To that end, JMC proposed the creation 
of a marine casualty investigation unit in the MOT (Abu Zeid, 2019). One can also say 
that the accident investigation division is still non-independent because the division is 





4.3 Cooperation Casualty Investigation 
Preliminary work on co-operation in the marine investigation was undertaken by 
IMO through Article 10.1 from Chapter 10 Co-operation of Casualty Investigation Code 
(2008). IMO recommended that to the extent practicable, all interested States shall 
cooperate in marine safety investigations (IMO, 2008).  
 
The Gulf of Aqaba, as shown in Figure 8, has significant importance to four 
countries: Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Egypt. The total coastline for the Gulf of 
Aqaba is 385 kilometers, and the boundary is divided roughly between the countries. 
Egypt has the longest coastline, with 200 km.  Saudi Arabia’s coastline is 150 km.; 







According to Rumley & Minghi (1991), Jordan is among the four countries most 
reliant on the Gulf of Aqaba since it is the only seaport to Jordan. The other outlets of 
Jordan are landlocked, and their route to the Mediterranean is only through the other 
countries, Lebanon, Syria and Israel (Rumley & Minghi, 1991). Despite, the political 
and economic conditions surrounding Jordan, Jordan has turned this single port into 
strength and used its tiny coastline as a lifeline by increasing its imports and exports and 
the prosperity of economic growth through the port of Aqaba (Rumley & Minghi, 1991). 
 
It can be seen from Figure 8, showing the Gulf of Aqaba’s border landscape, 
which any marine casualty that occurs outside the Jordanian territorial waters will be 
very close to the territorial waters of one of the other three countries. As such, the 
cooperation in marine casualty investigations will be an essential common opportunity 
for all these interested States to achieve maritime safety through establishing a regional 
marine accident investigation center in the Gulf of Aqaba (Salman, 2019).  
 
To demonstrate the essential role of cooperation in investigation, after the 
Estonia disaster in 1994, the accident investigation system at the EU level revealed 
weaknesses in identifying and reporting the causes of marine accidents as well as a lack 
of cooperation between the maritime administrations of the EU Member States. 
Therefore, to ensure the harmonization of investigation procedures and methods, 
cooperation and uniform solutions were established among the EU Member States by 
creating legal standards for casualty investigations. The European Parliament and the 
Council adopted Directive 2009/18/EC on 23 April 2009 to establish the fundamental 





4.4 Summary and Conclusions 
This Chapter addresses several contributing factors, which are stated in the 
provisions of the casualty investigation code. These factors are considered to be the 
essential reasons for the success or failure the investigation process and to the 
achievement of the main objective of the marine casualty investigation process itself. 
 
These factors mentioned above are, first, primarily for marine investigators with 
respect for two major areas of qualifications and adequate training. The second pertains 
to the independence of the investigation body and whether it has sufficient powers to 
make the proper decisions related to conducting investigations or not, without the 
presence of any external influences from entities related to the investigation. The final 
factor is the extent of the role of cooperation in casualty investigations among States. 
 
By comparison to the other states discussed above, in terms of impartiality, 
objectivity and independence measures in maritime investigations, there is still no 
evidence of a clear policy in Jordan to implement and enforce the standards of the 
Marine Casualty Investigation Code. Thus, there are no fundamental changes between 
Jordan before the IMSAS audit and Jordan after the IMSAS audit. At this point, Jordan 
still faces challenges to improve its performance. 
 
 In Jordan, despite the endeavors exerted in fulfilling its international obligations, 
there have been some disruptions in the attempts to implement the provisions of the 
casualty investigation code. For instance, despite granting their investigators judicial 
police power. However, due to some governmental decisions, there are insufficient 
financial resources to facilitate marine investigations. On the other hand, Jordan has 
strong points. This can be seen clearly in the first factor, the maritime qualifications and 
training of investigators. Additionally, Jordan has an opportunity to exploit its 









5. Chapter 5 Analysis and Findings  
Jordan faces several challenges, such as fluctuation in its external and internal 
conditions and context. This study seeks to provide answers to these challenges.  
Therefore, a content analysis of the strengths (S), weaknesses (W), opportunities (O) and 
threats (T) (SWOT) analysis have been carried out to determine whether Jordan is 
implementing the Casualty Investigation Code and meeting its obligations to the fullest 
extent. The analysis is summarized in the SWOT Matrix (Table 1) below.  
 
Strengths 
Which factors support the implementation of the Casualty Investigation Code in 
Jordan. What are the existing advantages? 
 
1. Ratification of all the relevant international maritime conventions, codes, 
and protocols. 
After reviewing the institutional and legal framework, and the international 
instruments that have been ratified by Jordan, it can be concluded that Jordan has 
acceded to all the international maritime instruments related to marine casualty 
investigations.  
 
2. Provision adequate specialized training 
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Effective training in respect of the responsibilities and modern investigative 
methods pertaining to the Casualty Investigation Code was observed. Therefore, 
qualified, proficient, competent and experienced investigators are provided by JMC. 
JMC provides investigators with adequate specialized training to investigate based on 
scientific methods.  
 
Weaknesses 
What could be improved? What is not done properly? What should be avoided? 
What obstacles prevent progress? Which elements need to be strengthened?  
 
1. Lack of meeting the national requirements in the marine casualty 
investigation instructions. 
JMC, as a governmental body, plays the legislator, regulator and supervisor of 
the maritime sector. At this point, the issuance of the local maritime legislation is 
extremely important in enforcing the relevant international instruments signed by 
Jordan. 
 
In addition, the national bodies in the maritime sector in Jordan, considered as 
JMC stakeholders, are not required to read the international instruments. Thus, these 
national entities will be looking for the Jordanian national legislation issued by JMC that 
governs the investigation of marine casualties, which is expected to deal with and 
regulate the current situation in Jordan. 
 
This finding has important implications for changing the marine casualty 
instructions from Instruction 2007 to the new Instruction 2017. For instance, there is a 
lack of a specific provision defining the purposes of carrying out a marine casualty 




2. Lack of specific and clear investigation methodologies.  
Neither the Instructions 2017 nor the JMC Process Manual 2018 mentions that 
the marine casualty investigation process in Jordan is based on any scientific models or 
systematic methods that should be used for the investigation of marine casualties. In 
fact, the investigators in Jordan have sufficient training and they had the maritime 
knowledge in the casualty investigations, the knowledge is identified in this case implicit 
knowledge. However, JMC should consider this knowledge, and training should be 
documented in the instructions nor the process manual according to ISO standards to 
become an explicit knowledge.  
 
3. The investigation division is a non-independent body. 
According to Abuelenin (2017), the requirement for an effective marine casualty 
investigation is to ensure effective marine safety investigation and to support the 
independence of all parties involved in the investigation. Therefore, the investigation 
shall be carried out by another administration (Abuelenin, 2017).  
 
Despite the recommendation of the IMO audit report 2016 and the initial effort 
made by JMC on 24 December 2018 as a corrective action by suggesting the separation 
of investigation duties, the JMC still has a non-independent marine casualty 
investigation body.  
   
Opportunities 
Where are the chances to enhance the current practice? What benefit can occur? 
1. Regional harmonization  
 Jordan is located on a cargo transit corridor; the Aqaba port is a gateway for the 
transit goods to neighboring countries. Moreover, it is considered as a major center for 
Jordanian maritime trade in exports and imports. Therefore, the investigation of marine 
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casualty accidents and the development of policies to reduce incidents and accidents in 
the Jordanian territorial water is an important factor to ensure maritime safety. 
 
The main challenge pertaining to international casualty investigations in the Gulf 
of Aqaba is the need for international harmonization under conditions of common 
approaches in order to comply with quality and credibility standards. 
 
All States that share the Gulf of Aqaba are members of IMO, and all of them are 
supposed to implement their international instrument obligations in respect of marine 
casualty investigations. This is an opportunity for Jordan to initiate bilateral agreements 
with each State in the Gulf of Aqaba, establish a regional center for marine casualty 




What obstacles are found in the current implementation of the Casualty 
Investigation Code in Jordan? 
The current practice is subjected to considerable threats that restrict the full 
implementation of the Casualty Investigation Code, such as poor implementation or 
misdirected practices. 
 
1. Insufficient financial allocations 
The Jordanian government’s policy decisions such as reducing financial 
expenditures lead to fluctuations in JMCs’ budget. Insufficient financial allocation 
hinders the investigation process. In addition, this will lead to a failure to provide 
adequate financial allocations to implement the Casualty Investigation Code and affect 




2. Shortage in effective implementation of international codes 
Abuelenin (2017), based on two case studies on improving special measures for 
marine accident investigation procedures, indicated that the reason for the insufficient 
maritime accident investigation is the shortage in applying international regulations 
related to maritime safety, and a lack of legal measures (Abuelenin, 2017). 
 
A marine casualty investigation based on scientific and systematic methods will 
structure the investigation process and enhance the identification of causes, drafting the 
report based on the integrity of findings and the validity of recommendations (Roed-




‐ Ratify all the international maritime 
conventions, codes, protocols. 
‐ Provide adequate specialized training. 
‐ Regional harmonization.  
Weaknesses Threats 
‐ Lack of meeting the national 
requirements in the marine casualty 
investigation instructions. 
‐ Lack of specific and clear investigation 
methodologies.  
‐ The investigation division is a Non-
independent body. 
‐ Insufficient financial allocations. 
















6. Chapter 6 Recommendations 
The aim of this dissertation is to expose inadequacies in the current implementation 
of international and national casualty investigation legislation in Jordan. It was observed 
through the review of law, regulations and instructions of various States that the States 
differ in the way they implement their international obligations in relation to the 
provisions of the Casualty Investigation Code. Moreover, it has been observed that the 
power and the extent of the authorization in the implementation of some of these 
regulations come from the accurate statement of the provisions of the Casualty 
Investigation Code in their national regulations. In other words, Jordan should set out 
detailed national regulations that give an accurate reading of the state's understanding of 
the provisions of the Casualty Investigation Code. 
 
The efforts made by Jordan to adopt the Marine Casualty Investigation Code to 
enhance marine safety standards might not be enough to the extent that the country 
needs to further effectively and adequately implement the international instrument. The 
IMO IMSAS audit of 2016 reveals that there is still significant room for improvement. 
 
In particular, and in order to ensure the objectivity and impartiality of casualty 
investigations, Jordan should respect the independence and impartiality of investigators. 
JMC should strive hard to ensure an independent body to conduct marine casualty 
investigations. Such a status of independence should be measured against legal, 
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financial, organizational and sufficient resource indicators. Thus, this challenge of 
independence entails another challenge, which is to ensure the continuity of this 
independence without any political influence or consideration. 
 
Systematic and organized training and competence development have mainly been 
the responsibility of JMC. Jordan has shown full interest in investigator training. 
Another challenge facing Jordan is the development and implementation of basic, 
coordinated and high-level training courses for investigators. Moreover, an important 
factor is the ability to identify training needs and to utilize training programs from 
competent international institutions in maritime safety. Transforming implicit expert 
knowledge into explicit knowledge happens by disseminating the training and 
knowledge provided to the investigators 
 
Jordan must strive to be the first to initiate a regional center for the marine casualty 
investigations in the Gulf of Aqaba; consequently, there will be a significant opportunity 
for the exchange of experience among the marine investigators of all the States. 
Regional cooperation at an efficient and effective level will enhance maritime safety in 
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